Key points from 'Dynamic Benefits: Towards Welfare That Works'
The Centre for Social Justice, a think tank set up by Iain Duncan Smith, has released a report calling for the replacement of 51 separate working age benefits with just two:
- Universal Work Credit would replace out of work benefits (JSA, IB, ESA, and IS), and would require participation in welfare to work programmes in order to 'earn' it
- Universal Life Credit would replace more general support benefits (HB, CTB, DLA, WTC, and CTC).
The other main element of the proposal is tapering the benefits so that they are gradually reduced as people do more work. The authors claim that the proposal would cost money in the short term (£3.7bn a year) but would be self-financing in the longer term.
They claim that the proposals' impact will be to:
- Not reduce out of work benefits for any recipient of them. This presumably means that many of the existing rules within each benefit will be rolled into the new benefit
- Remove the marginal tax rate barrier to job entry, where up to 95% of the extra money earned in a job is immediately taken off a person's benefits
- Remove the benefit risk of job entry, where taking a job and leaving benefits can introduce long delays and potential refusal if the job doesn't work out
- Reduce benefit 'penalties' for families, home owners, and people with savings
- Reduce the overall complexity of dealing with the benefits system, making it simpler, easier, less stressful, and cheaper to start and stop claims
Will I lose my benefits or get less money?
Like many other welfare reforms in recent years, this proposal claims that it won't make people on benefits worse off. This is because it will not change the amount of money awarded to workless recipients, instead focusing on moving all the benefits under one roof (the DWP's) and applying a taper mechanism. However, I'm still reading up on eligibility - the Universal Work Credit appears to have different conditionality to the existing system.
The taper mechanism means that people in work will experience a very different system. No benefits will be lost or stopped when a claimant starts work, with any benefit reductions instead being taken out of PAYE. This also removes the need to reclaim benefits if the work stops or ends, and the attendant delays and paperwork. The proposal claims that only two groups will be worse off: families earning over £30,000 a year, and a few people working just over the number of hours required claim Working Tax Credit.
What happens when I get a job?
The key change beyond merging the different benefits is that they will all be withdrawn using a simple taper mechanism. This means that once earnings reach a certain level, a proportion of earnings above that will be taken out of the person's benefits. This means that, as the person earns more, they gradually get less and less benefit, until they earn enough that all of the benefits are repaid and their entire income comes from employment. Because this is taken out of earnings using PAYE, if the earnings go down or stop in a particular month, then the benefit reduction in PAYE automatically adjusts to take account of the new circumstances.
A basic earnings level, called an earnings disregard, will be set for each household. The earnings disregard depends on factors such as number of children, rent and council tax supplements, and lone parent status. 55% of post-tax earnings above this level will be taken away from the benefits, with HMRC handling the benefit reduction through the PAYE system. Interestingly, this also removes means-testing of benefits, as benefits can be awarded without looking at earnings, then taken away again by HMRC as and when the earnings reach appropriate levels.
What it would mean for Jobcentre and provider staff
On the face of it, the new proposal would remove a hefty proportion of the current roadblocks to getting people back to work. It would make work far more attractive by letting people keep more of the money they earn. People could take on casual, part-time, or temporary work without going through shedloads of paperwork and a long reclaim period. The in and out of work process being rolled out across the country would itself be superseded by a simpler and more friendly system.
It would also potentially resolve the benefit trap. London especially has had a Housing Benefit trap that can make it difficult and risky to get lone parents back to work, but all out-of-work families with low earning prospects and more than a few children have historically been trapped in unemployment.
However, this will impact on delivery in unexpected ways. How would programmes cope with customers who had a habit of getting a couple of days of work whenever a meeting was scheduled, or who cycled in and out of work every couple of weeks, or who were in work on low hours with no intention of increasing them? Would it become more difficult to get people into 16 hours plus employment if there is no similar cut-off point for benefits? Would programmes start to focus exclusively on casual labour as a means of getting people off benefits? Would it open up innovations such as cycling people through different work opportunities until they found one that fit them? At the very least, such a system would require a full review of existing contracts.
Criticisms of the report
Tapered benefits are not a new idea, although the mix of benefit unification and tapering is a particularly elegant solution to the handling of it. Criticisms include:
- It would discourage full time work and lead to a culture of partial benefits dependency - I've heard Labour ministers (Purnell?) pooh-pooh the idea for this specific reason
- It would cost more money than it saved
- It wouldn't make the individual benefits much simpler, so the two resulting benefits would be incredibly complex to claim and administer - this could be countered with the argument that going between a whole range of different agencies to claim the different benefits would still be more difficult and costly than filling in one big-ass form. Advisers and decision makers would need some fairly heavy training to understand the whole lot though
- It didn't work in Ireland - While tapered benefits have been tried in Ireland, there's an argument that the implementation was bungled
- It's a recession. There aren't enough jobs to go round so there's no point in this now - I'm not totally sure what the argument is in this, but I've seen it put forward
- Merging benefits would remove tailored support - This was a Lib Dem criticism. Their alternative appears to be tinkering with the present system
- The benefits system is actually pretty good - This was the gist of Jim Knight's response for Labour. Possibly he didn't watch Benefit Busters
What are the chances of it actually happening?
The report is not a Conservative Party report, and has not been endorsed by the Conservatives. Iain Duncan Smith's work in the social policy arena has attracted respect from all sides, but his previous Broken Britain report doesn't appear to have been fully taken on board by his own or other parties.
The big halfbrick of an objection that could stop this from becoming Conservative policy is that it requires £3.6bn of extra funding a year, plus transition and setup costs. This goes completely against the current plan of drastically decreasing government spending over the next few years. It's also worth noting that the experience of other countries that have successfully cut spending suggests the welfare state is the most likely target.
As a counter to this, the proposal doesn't demand that everyone keep the same benefit entitlement, so much as it deliberately ignores benefit changes. It's entirely possible to set up the new system and simultaneously reduce individual benefit amounts or eligibility, although it's far from certain that £3.6bn could be saved in the process.
Another barrier to acceptance is the localisation agenda, with Conservatives such as the leader of Essex County Council arguing for complete devolution of the benefits system to a local level. Each local area could of course implement something similar to this proposal if they chose.
With these objections in mind, it would still offer a way for the Conservatives to break ranks on welfare reform - Theresa May has been trying hard to differentiate their policies from Labour's in recent speeches, without success.
Responses to the report
- Public Finance have a generally positive response by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
- Links UK blogger highlights the importance of the proposals to bringing the 'informal' (i.e. black and grey) economy into the work-declaring, tax paying mainstream. However, this article in the Independent points to research that shows most of the informal economy is powered by illegal immigrants
- The Independent portrays Labour and Liberal Democrats as hostile, Conservatives as stand-offish
- Child Poverty Action Group welcome the principle of tapering but want more support for specific needs and less expectation of job entry for people who can't work
- Herald columnist writes a detailed, somewhat sceptical response, then goes and spoils it by calling Pathways to Work 'well-designed'
- Daily Mail columnist calls Iain Duncan Smith a 'heroic figure'
- BBC forums have the usual selection of dole-scrounger rants
Resources
- Report homepage
- Executive summary of the report (pdf)
- BBC article
- An earlier site discussion on the universal benefit idea. The new proposals sidestep many of the identified issues by not seeking to simplify many of the basic eligibility rules, but some of the points raised are still very applicable
- The Citizen's Income is a more radical idea that would give everyone a fixed benefit, paid each month regardless of earnings. This removes all conditionality from the system, making work a matter of choice rather than necessity
- The attachment below summarises a paper by Deven Ghelani covering some of the same ground, originally submitted as part of the recent welfare reform consultations
| Attachment | Size |
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| Disregarding_Incentives_Summary_May09.pdf | 65.68 KB |






Comments
Notice - I'll build up the content in the article in response to questions or comments. Let me know what more you'd like to know and I'll happily put it in
As a personal response, I'm fairly impressed by what I've seen of the proposals. They would need to be well implemented to avoid a godawful mess, but they make a lot of sense and respond to the frustrations raised by everyone involved in the system. This article in the Guardian from last month could almost be an advert for the report.
Having said all that, I still need to read the full report in depth. If anyone finds any devils hiding there, feel free to point them out.
Hi Daniel,
Perhaps you could post the summary paper on tapered benefits that I sent to you a couple of weeks ago on the Indus Delta website - it mirrors the IDS report and comes from the perspective of a former claimant. Your feedback on this was much appreciated, perhaps introduce your objections re: ongoing partial state support into this debate.
As a side note, I worked with Maeve McGoldrick in developing the tapered benefits proposal - the Guardian article you link to is essentially an extension of that work.
I'm hoping to get to digesting the full report tonight - I look forward to hearing informed views on the proposals through the site.
Regards,
Deven.
Thanks Deven. I've attached the summary paper to the piece. I noted Maeve's contribution to the Guardian article, and have been meaning to get in touch directly for a while now. I used to bulk import Community Links / Links UK stories into the provider section of the site, but we dropped out of touch for some reason.
Al least this is moving in the right direction, for it recognises problems that current (and likely future) policies fail to address. It would be better though to go even further and replace all benefits with a Citizen's Income, as explained here:
http://www.citizensincome.org/
I consider that this would have many positive effects, such as removing the vexed issue of "conditionality" - imagine a world without that. Virtually no administration, most of the common frauds eliminated at a stroke, no need for spies and snoopers, no need for Jobcentres or indeed most of the DWP in its current form. Most current problems stem from government and media obsession with "dolescroungers" - I have many years experience of the benefit system and and simply do not see the "scroungers" existing in any numbers large enough to be worth worrying about. If the system is right then basic greed ensures that the vast majority of people will work if the work is available and they are capable of it.
Also, removing that element of compulsion will gradually erase the worst kinds of employers from the economy. I'm thinking of the many agencies that (by the very nature of their business)simply mess people around, and the type of factories and so on that rely on bullying tactics to achieve a result - the kind of employers that claimants quite understandably don't want to work for, but who are guaranteed supplies of fresh victims under the current system, or any nastier tougher derivatives of it. I know this idea won't go down well with the likes of the CBI, but I firmly believe that companies who can only survive and compete by mistreating their workforce have no place in a modern democratic society.
This comment about tapered benefits in Ireland came in a few days ago. Thought it made sense to reproduce here:
Although the Report may yet to be adopted by the Conservative Party as the forthcoming election encroaches, surely precedent suggests that the Labour Party will fully adopt the proposals ...... and, in some respects, the report is quite modest in comparison to the extremes proposed by James Purnell as he managed the Wlefare Reform Bill through Parliament before his resignation.
If I will be unemployed I would go for this benefit since it's like a share that I can use while I'm still incapable of earning but ones that I get a job it will likely be fair to give back the benefits I've had before. It's just right for us to give equal chance to those who cannot afford to avail services since they barely have something to spend. But it doesn't ease up our share of taxes paid for them though. In taxing hypothesis for our country one common item is the Laffer Curve that is made popular by Jude Wanniski. Disceptation goes that there's a center of taxation rates which makes for optimal gathering and use of tax funding, a basic for pay day loans from the individuals to the government. It's clearly a part of Keynesian economics, and the Austrians give controversy to its effect.
Can anyone tell me if a young person reaches six months claim, then completes one of the January Guarantee provisions, say CTF for 3 months, then goes back to JSA at Stage 1, when they reach the 26 week stage again are they rereferred back to CTF or another January guarantee provision, or do they continue on to 52 weeks and FND?
CTF the young person will rejoin jobseeker's regime at the week of unemployment that they left into CTF at, they will then progress to FND
FJF if the young person is employed for 28 days or more then they will return to Stage 1, Day 1 signing. Otherwise they link back to their previous period of unemployment and rejoin at the stage they left at - with a possible mandatory referral to CTF looming as well.
A young person who goes to CTF cannot then take up an FJF opportunity..... little hope of progression there then!!
Hi,
A good summary - thanks. Some key questions that I have (and would really appreciate your views on):
- As implied above, there is no concept of benefits being tapered over time - only being tapered against earnings. That means that benefit payment could continue indefinitely if earnings do not rise high enough? Are there any proposals to counter that?
- How clear is the break between eligibility and payment of benefits? The report seems to be clear that existing benefit elibility and entitlement rules will not change; all that changes is how benefit payments are withdrawn. However, that is surely contradictory? For example, you are only eligible for JSA if you work less than 16 hours a week. The idea of Dynamic Benefits is surely that you can start earning more than 16 hours a week without losing all your benefit entitlements, i.e. you continue some benefit payment after you are working more than 16 hours. Hence eligibility rules have now changed.
- The report implies some non-means tested benefits are now to become means-tested. For example, contribution-based JSA and DLA. If cont-based JSA were subject to tapers, how would that work? At the moment there is a payment "cliff" once the recipient starts working 16 hours or more per week. Before that, they could keep the full benefit plus earnings. Work an extra hour at £5.80 (min wage) and suddenly you lose £60.50. Could tapering handle that? DLA is not currently means tested, but if it is made part of ULC, which is tapered with earnings, then suddenly it is. If it is to be means-tested, I would expect to see that in the business case for Dynamic Benefits (but it is not).
- How would giving passported benefits a notional value actually work? I would assume it would have to mean the whole concept of free prescriptions etc is replaced with a monetary equivalent added to the current benefit payment. Otherwise at what point is entitlement to passported benefits swapped for a monetary value? E.g. a receipient, once their earnings reached X, would lose their entitlement to some passported benefits and would gain an extra £5 per week benefit as an offset.
- I would also be interested in any ideas of how the existing benefit claimant base is to cut across to the Dynamic Benefit rules.